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On 9 September 2001, the Herero People's Reparations Corporation
lodged a claim in a civil court in the US District of Columbia. The claim
was directed against the Federal Republic of Germany, in the person of
the German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, for crimes against humanity,
slavery, forced labor, violations of international law, and genocide.
Ninety-seven years earlier, on n January 1904, in a small and dusty
town in central Namibia, the first genocide of the twentieth Century
began with the eruption of the Herero—German war.' By the time
hostilities ended, the majority of the Herero had been killed, driven off
their land, robbed of their cattle, and banished to near-certain death in
the sandy wastes of the Omaheke desert. The survivors, mostly women
and children, were incarcerated in concentration camps and put to work
as forced laborers (Gewald, 1995; 1999: 141—91). Throughout the twenti-
eth Century, Herero survivors and their descendants have struggled to gain
recognition and compensation for the crime committed against them.
Following a brief description of the Herero genocide, this chapter
provides a chronological overview of the way in which the Herero have
sought to draw the world's attention to the crimes committed by Imperial
Germany in Namibia. Calls for compensation will in the end revolve
around the issue of German government responsibility. That is, to what
extent were the Herero genocide and related atrocities the product of
official German policy? To what extent were the criminal acts not merely
the actions of individuals? Material presented here will show that the
Herero genocide and associated atrocities were indeed officially sanctioned.
In the war, the German settlers and soldiers carried out a shoot-to-kill
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policy, conducted extrajudicial külings, established concentration camps,
employed forced labor, and in at least two cases established death camps.
After the war, the loss of Herero liberty, land, and stock was officially
sanctioned in legislation. At no stage after 1904 were any German settlers
or soldiers brought to justice for genocidal acts committed in Namibia
between 1904 and 1908.
The Herero—German War
In 1904, a war characterized by extreme brutality and deliberate genocide
broke out in the central Namibian settlement of Okahandja. It arose frorn
a series of misunderstandings and the self-fulfilling prophecies of the
paranoid settler class.2 As the war steadily spread across central Namibia, it
grew in intensity and viciousness, as fresh contingents of German troops
despatched from Imperial Germany poured into the country and attempted
to impose their vision of'order' on the territory and its inhabitants. The
personal involvement of the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, in deciding how
the war was to be fought in German South West Africa signalled the
highest authorization and endorsement for acts committed in the name of
Imperial Germany. In a conscious policy of genocide, German soldiers and
settlers sought, shot, beat, hanged, starved, and raped Herero men, women,
and children. When the war fmally ended, no fewer than 80 per cent of
the Herero had lost their lives. Those who remained in Namibia, primarily
women and children, survived in concentration camps as forced laborers
employed on state, military, and civilian projects (Gewald, 1999: 141-230).
In short, the war and its aftermath were characterized by extreme acts of
violence and cruelty on the part of German soldiers and settlers.
The diaries, letters, and photographs of contemporaries graphically
portray the indiscriminate shootings, hangings, and beatings which were
the order of the day. Missionary Elger, stationed in the settlement of
Karibib, described the manner in which Herero prisoners were treated:
Things proceeded in a particularly brutal manner. Herero prisoners were terri-
bly maltreated, whether they were guüty or not guilty. About 4 Herero were
taken prisoner, because they were supposed to have killed a railway worker
(Lehmann, Habis). The court martial ordered them to be freed and declared
them to be not guilty. However one could not release them as they bore too
many marks of shameful abuse [Schandlicher Misshandlung] on their bodies. For
example, people had beaten an eye out of one. After the court martial had
declared them to be innocent, some of the Germans outside immediately re-
sumed the abuse with the words, 'the court has declared you to be innocent,
we however want to string you up.'3
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After the initial battles, the civilian governor was relieved of his
command and replaced by the Kaiser's own candidate, Lieutenant-General
Lothar von Trotha.4 Under the command of von Trotha, the German
army sought to engineer a crushing defeat of the Herero in the vicinity
of the Waterberg (Pool, 1979: 210—11). In keeping with von Moltke's
principles of separate deployment and encirclement, von Trotha sent his
armies to annihilate the Herero at the Waterberg. Or, as he put it in his
own words:
My initial plan for the Operation, which I always adhered to, was to encircle the
masses of Hereros at Waterberg, and to annihilate these masses with a simul-
taneous blow, then to establish various stations to hunt down and disarm the
splinter groups who escaped, later to lay hands on the captains by putting prize
money on their heads and fmally to sentence them to death. (von Trotha's
diaries cited in Pool, 1991: 251)
On 11 August, the battle of Hamakari at the Waterberg took place. The
Herero were defeated and fled in a southeasterly direction into the dry
desert sands of the Kalahari, known to the Herero as the Omaheke.5 On
Sunday, 2 October 1904, after holding a field service, General von Trotha
addressed his orHcers (Rust, 1905: 384). He declared that the war against
the Herero would be pursued in all earnestness, and read a proclamation
that stated, among other things:
The Herero people must ... leave the land. If the populace does not do this I
will force them with the Groot Rohr [cannon]. Within the German borders
every Herero, with or without a gun, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will
no longer accept women and children, I will drive them back to their people
or I will let them be shot at.
These are my words to the Herero people.
[Signed] The great General of the mighty German Kaiser.6
A number of authors have sought to deny or at least downplay the
existence and implications of Trotha's proclamation, which has become
known as the extermination order (Vernkhtungsbefehl) .7 However, Trotha's
own words, in his diary and elsewhere, indicate that hè understood the
implications of his proclamation füll well. On the day the proclamation
was issued, Trotha wrote in a letter:
I believe that the nation as such should be annihilated, or, if this was not
possible by tactical measures, have to be expelled from the country by operative
means and further detailed treatment. This will be possible if the water-holes
from Grootfontein to Gobabis are occupied. The constant movement of our
troops will enable us to find the small groups of the nation who have moved
back westwards and destroy them gradually....
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My mtimate knowledge of many central African tribes (Bantu and others)
has everywhere convmced me of the necessity that the Negro does not respect
treaties but only brute force. (Pool, 1991: 272-4)
From 1904 and into 1905, one of von Trotha's officers, Major von
Estorff, 'had the thankless task of chasing after the refugees in the Sandveld
and preventing their return'. Estorff s own words clearly describe both his
own actions and the intentions of his commanding officer, Trotha:
I followed their spoor and found numerous wells which presented a terrifying
sight. Cattle which had died of thirst lay scattered around the wells. These cattle
had reached the wells but there had not been enough time to water them. The
Herero fled ahead of us into the Sandveld. Again and again this terrible scène
kept repeating itself. With fevensh energy the men had worked at opening the
wells; however the water became ever sparser, and wells ever more rare. They
fled from one well to the next and lost virtually all their cattle and a large
number of their people. The people shrank mto small remnants who continu-
ally feil into our hands [unsere Gewalt kamen]; sections of the people escaped
now and later through the Sandveld into English territory [present-day Bot-
swana]. It was a policy as gruesome as it was senseless, to hammer the people
so much; we could have still saved many of them and their rieh herds, if we had
pardoned and taken them up again; they had been punished enough. I sug-
gested this to General von Trotha, but hè wanted their total extermination.
(von Estorff, 1979: 117; author's translation)
In early 1905, the German parliament rescinded von Trotha's extermi-
nation order, after which time captured Herero were placed into concen-
tration camps (Konzentrationslager) and put to work as forced laborers. By
late 1905, an estimated 8,800 Herero were conflned in camps, working on
various military and civilian projects scattered across German South West
Africa (Berichte der Rheinischen Missions-Gesellschafi, 1906: 10). Missionary
sources provide us with eyewitness accounts of conditions in the camps.
Missionaries stationed in the Herero Konzentrationslager reported to their
superiors in Germany on the extensive and unchecked rape, beatings and
execution of surrendered Herero by German soldiers (Gewald, 1999: 184-
204). Missionary Kuhlmann spoke of the delight of settler women wit-
nessing the drawn-out public hangings of captured Herero in Windhoek.
At one such hanging, a drooling Herero fighting for his life was berated:
'You swine, wipe your muzzle' (Oermann, 1998: 113—14). In Karibib,
missionary Elger wrote:
And then the scattered Herero returned from the Sandfeld. Everywhere they
popped up — not in their original areas - to submit themselves as pnsoners.
What did the wretched people look like?! Some of them had been starved to
skeletons with hollow eyes, powerless and hopeless, afflicted by serious diseases,
particularly with dysentery. In the settlements they were placed in big kraals,
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and there they lay, without blankets and some without clothing, in the tropical
ram on the marshlike ground. Here death reaped a harvest! Those who had
some semblance of energy naturally had to work—
It was a terrible misery with the people; they died in droves. Once 24 came
together, some of them carried. In the next hour one died, in the evening the
second, in the first week a total of ten - all [lost] to dysentery - the people had
lost all their energy and all their will to live
Hardly cheering cases were those where people were handed in to be healed
from the effects of extreme mistreatment [schwerer Misshandlungen]: there were
bad cases amongst these.8
In the settlement of Windhoek, missionary Meier described the con-
dition of Herero who came to the sickbay run by the mission. His words
provide some idea of what occurred in the Windhoek camp:
How often these poorest, those who deserved pity, came staggering! Many of
them, who could no longer move, were brought on stretchers, most of them
unconscious; however, those who could still think were glad that the hard
supervision of the ... guards in the Kraal and their Shambok [rawhide whip] ...
had for the time being been left behind'.9
The Herero camps were fmally abolished in !9o8.Thereafter, the Herero
were confined within a tangled web of legislation that sought to control
every aspect of the lives of all black people living in German South West
Africa (GSWA). Within the areas of German control, all Africans over the
age of 8 were ordered to wear metal passes. These passes, which were
embossed with imperial crown, magisterial district, and labor number,
were used to facilitate German control of labor. In addition, Herero were
prohibited from owning land and cattle, the two foundations of what had
been a society based on pastoralism.10
The 'Blue Book'
At the outbreak of the First World War, South African forces under British
command invaded GSWA and successfully defeated the much-vaunted
German army. As the war progressed, it became clear that the victorious
parties had no intention of allowing Germany to retain its colonies. To
this end, from at least 1915 onwards British colonial officials were in-
structed to gather materials which would strengthen the British Empires
claims to Germany's colonies.11 In Namibia, this task was made much
easier by the existence of an extremely well-organized and detailed gov-
ernment archive which awaited the incoming military administration in
Windhoek. It contained chillingly detailed accounts and reports on the
manner in which GSWA settlers, and the colony's administration, had
64 G E N O C I D E , WAR C R I M E S AND THE WEST
dealt with the country's original inhabitants. Apart from files dealing with
the incarceration of Herero in concentration camps and their distribution
among settlers and private companies, the archives also contained a series
of files on the excesses of settlers who had flogged Herero and Nama12
workers. Glass-plate negatives detailed the torn and rotting backs of women
flogged for alleged insubordination, and pages upon pages of court tran-
scripts detailed the brutal lashing of laborers.13
The combination of dry testimony taken from the German archives in
Windhoek, along with a series of painstakingly detailed statements given
under oath by surviving Namibians, formed the basis of one of the most
shocking documents of colonial history. The Report on the Natives of South-
West Africa and their Treatment by Germany (London, 1918), generally referred
to as the 'Blue Book,' remains an indispensable source document on the
nature of German colonial rule in Namibia. It is beyond question that
these materials efFectively scuttled any attempts by Germany to retain
control over its former colonies, and Namibia in particular.14 In Article
119 of the Versailles Treaty, Germany was declared unfit to govern colonies,
and was forced to renounce 'in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.' In addition,
under Article 22 of the new League of Nations charter, Namibia was held
to be 'inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the
strenuous conditions of the modern world,' and thus was deemed a ter-
ritory that could 'be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory
[the Union of South Africa] as integral portions of its territory.' Accord-
ingly, Namibia was placed under the jurisdiction of South Africa (see du
Pisani, 1985: 76).
Though the 'Blue Book' is one of the primary documents detailing the
injustices perpetrated against the Herero and Nama peoples of Namibia,
it was not used to ensure that Herero would receive compensation. Instead,
the 'Blue Book' served to ensure that Namibian territory would be granted
to South Africa to administer as a mandated territory. Far from the Herero
receiving their land back, the new South African administration forced
them to settle on marginal lands in reserves established on the fringes of
the Omaheke, the desert into which they had been driven in the past.
The new South African administration continued the policies initiated by
its German predecessor. The lands previously occupied by the Herero
continued to be reserved for white settlement, and in the years after
World War I the South African administration pursued an aggressive policy
of land settlement for white Afrikaans-speaking immigrants from Angola
and South Africa. In short, the injustices described with stark clarity in
the 'Blue Book' were dismissed in the interests of white settler unity.
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White settler unity and the 'Blue Book'
Nonetheless, the existence of the 'Blue Book' came to bedevil settler
politics under the South African mandate. German settlers called for the
'Blue Book' to be banned and all extant copies destroyed. In 1925, the
first all-white election for a legislative assembly took place. Representa-
tives of the German settler party, the Deutsche Bund in Südwestafrika,
opposed settler parties allied to the Union of South Africa. Anxious to
maintain a working relationship with the settler bloc in the legislative
assembly, the South African administrator, A.J. Werth, acceded to settler
demands for the abolition of the 'Blue Book.' Thus, in 1926, one Mr
Strauch, a member of the legislative assembly, tabled a motion stating that
the 'Blue Book' 'only has the meaning of a war-instrument15 and that the
time has come to put this instrument out of Operation and to impound
and destroy all copies of this Blue Book, which may be found in the
official records and in public libraries of this Territory.'16
The motion passed, and legislation came into effect in all territories
administered by the Union of South Africa banning distribution of the
'Blue Book.' Copies were no longer made available to the public, were
removed from libraries, and were destroyed. In the rest of the British
Empire, copies of the 'Blue Book' were transferred to the Foreign Office.
Even in wartime Britain as late as 1941, in response to a request from the
Ministry of Information, it was noted that 'no copy may be issued with-
out authority of the librarian.'17
Strauch, and his fellow members of the Deutscher Bund, consciously
used the Herero genocide — or rather the recorded role of German
settlers and soldiers in it - to put pressure on the South African admin-
istration. As Strauch noted, passing the motion hè had proposed 'would
... remove one of the most serious obstacles to mutual trust and co-
operation in this country [Namibia].' In his view,'the honour of Germany
had been attacked in the most public manner and it was right that the
attack should be repudiated in an equally public fashion.... The defence
of the honour of ones country was a solemn duty imposed upon all sons
of that country.' The validity of Strauchs claims went unquestioned by
the assembly, and certainly no Herero view of the events was allowed an
airing. The subjective arguments of Strauch and his compatriots thus
sought to obscure the past in the interest of preserving their own privi-
leged position as settlers. The promise of peaceful cooperation with the
German settler Community was uppermost in the minds of South Africa's
administrators. Strauchs claim that 'the Germans were ready and anxious
to cooperate in the building up of South West but they could not do so
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fully until the stigma imposed by the publication of the Bluebook ... had
been removed front their name' was considered a more powerful con-
sideration than either historica! veracity or the views of Namibias African
inhabitants.
Seeking to deny the past
In the run-up to Namibian independence in 1990, Brigitte Lau, a historian
well known for her uncompromising stand against South African colonial
rule in Namibia, published an article that shocked and surprised many of
her colleagues. In her article, she stated: There is absolutely no evidence
... that the Herero perished or were used on a large scale as "slave
laborers"' (Lau, 1989: 5). Furthermore, Lau argued that the Vernichtungs-
befehl issued by General Lothar vonTrotha, commanding officer of German
forces in Namibia at the time, 'was a successful attempt at psychological
warfare never followed in deed' (Lau, 1989: 5). In addition, Lau sought to
problematize the term Vernichtung by arguing that it did not imply exter-
mination.18 Finally, she argued that the basis for much of the allegations
of genocide by German soldiers in Namibia, the 1904 'Report of the Treat-
ment of Natives by Germany' (sic), was 'an English piece of war propaganda
with no credibility whatsoever' (Lau, 1989: s).19 Needless to say, Lau's
article exploded like a bombshell among the small Community of scholars
specializing in Namibian history (Lau, 1989: 4—8).20
With hindsight, and on the basis of later conversations, it became clear
that Lau wished to move the academie community away from what she
saw as its unjust fascination with the Herero—German war. Instead, she
argued, historians should concentrate on what she considered to be the
more destructive colonial rule of South Africa in Namibia. Yet again, the
genocide that Imperial Germany perpretrated upon the Herero was being
negated and denied in the interests of contemporary politics. Neverthe-
less, Lau's article, recently republished in German, continues to have
repercussions that extend far beyond Namibian history. On the electronic
website of the Traditionsverband ehemaliger Schutz und Uberseetruppen
(Traditional association of the former protectorate and overseas forces), an
organization that seeks to preserve and glorify the memory of Germany's
colonial armies, Laus article is predictably acclaimed.21 In addition, the
Traditionsverband directs readers to 'Wiedergutmachung am der Volk der
Herero?' (Restitution for the Herero People?), an article that denies von
Trotha harboured any genocidal intentions, and seeks to dismiss Herero
claims for reparations.22
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Michael Scott and Herero representations to the UN
To the members of the white settler community, it may have looked as if
the attempt to destroy and rewrite the past according to their own
preferences had succeeded. For a number of years after 1926, nothing was
heard of the Herero genocide. Within the territory, Herero had been
forced to withdraw to the newly established Native reserves, where they
refrained from directly articulating demands that related to the genocide
(Gewald, 2OOi).This is not to say that the genocide was no longer of any
importance to Herero society - far front it. Instead, Herero society turned
in upon itself, seeking äs far äs possible to refrain from any interaction
with the colonial state. References to the genocide perpetrated against the
Herero surfaced from time to time in unexpected places, yet the subject
\vas no longer part and parcel of the colonial discourse.23
In the aftermath of World War II, the South African government under-
took steps to incorporate Namibia as the fifth province of the Union of
South Africa. To this end, in 1946 a series of carefully structured meetings
were held with the African population of the territory. As the newly
formed United Nations had taken over from the League of Nations,
Namibia, as a mandated territory, feil again under South African juris-
diction, with UN oversight. It was widely hoped that the colonially
appointed and recognized leaders of Namibias African populations would
give their sanction to South Africa's plan to incorporate Namibia. How-
ever, this was not to be. The events of 1904—08 again became central to
the concerns of settlers and the colonial administration with the arrival of
the Rev. Michael Scott in Windhoek in 1947.24 In conjunction with
Herero leaders, Scott used the atrocities perpetrated in the Herero geno-
cide as a weapon against the incorporation of Namibia into South Africa.
In the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, the füll extent of which was
still only just beginning to be understood, an earlier genocide inflicted by
the fathers of the Nazi perpetrators made for powerful political ammuni-
tion (Emmett, 1999: 253).
Throughout most of 1948, Michael Scott lived in a tent along the
Gammans river, just beyond the old location of Windhoek. Here hè met
and entertained township residents, many of whom had experienced the
horrors of German rule firsthand (Troup, 1950: 173—80). Scott could not
fail to have his attention drawn to the Herero genocide. Here, in a
nutshell, Scott held, were the core inequities of colonial rule: a people
had been driven off their land, slaughtered, banished to live in barren
homelands — and still they held no rights. This concise presentation of
history served to detail the injustice suffered by the Herero, at the
68 G E N O C I D E , WAR C R I M E S AND THE WEST
hands not only of Imperial Germany, but of the mandated power, South
Africa.
An article entitled 'Michael Scott and the Hereros,' published in The
New Statesman and Nation in 1949, aptly summarized Scotts view of
Namibian history:
Then came the German colonists, hungry for land; and fmally von Trotha, a
genera! whom Hitler would have delighted to honour.... In 1904 hè issued the
'Extermination Order.' All Hereros whether man, woman or child were to be
killed. An orgy of looting, torture, and massacre followed. To read the records
is exactly like reading the accounts of the obliteration of Poland, except that the
Germans had not gas chambers then, but killed babies with their own hands,
or burned sick old women in their huts. The tribe broke and fled The
majority, all but fifteen thousand out of ninety thousand, were hacked to pieces
by the Germans or died of thirst.25
The mention of von Trotha s 'extermination order' clearly indicates that
Scott had managed to gain access to a copy of the 'Blue Book.' Scott's
history also made explicit the link between the horrors perpetrated by the
Nazis and the activities of Imperial Germany's forces in Namibia, a link
that continues to generale considerable academie interest.26 In addition,
Scott explored how the South Africans had betrayed the Herero:
In the 1914 war, lured by British promises that native lands would be returned,
the desert remnant trekked back. But in 1918 they met not the British as the
Mandatory Power, but the South Africans, who never for a moment considered
givmg them back their tribal lands. Some pastures were left to the German
settlers who remained. More went to the Afrikaner setders.27
Throughout 1948 and 1949, in the face of constant harassment, Scott
sought to bring conditions in Namibia to the attention of the world.
Eventually, in November 1949, the United Nations granted Scott an official
hearing. Clearly, this did not stand him in good stead with South African
officialdom. In the months following Scott's hearing, a campaign was
initiated by the colonial authorities in Namibia, seeking to cast aspersions
on Scott's statements.28 Vihfied in the press, Scott continued to be sup-
ported by Herero, many of whom recalled the events of 1904-08 to justify
their faith in the reverend. One such Herero, who signed his letter 'A
Native who has been deprived of his land from 1904—1950,' noted: 'I want
to emphasise that the Information given by the Rev. Michael Scott at
UNO is what actually happened in S.WA. and was obtained from the
best reliable sources' (Windhoek Advertiser, 1950). Shortly after, Scott, already
the victim of constant harassment, was declared a prohibited immigrant
and prevented from ever returning to Namibia.
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Genocide and the establishment of nationalist parties
In the Namibia of the 19505, the events of 1904-08 continued to live in
the memory of many Africans, and led directly to the establishment of the
South West African National Union (SWANU) and the South West African
Peoples Organization (SWAPO). Particularly within SWANU, which came
to be dominated by Herero ideologues, the loss of land incurred in the
Herero genocide proved a major mobilizing factor (Ngavirue, 1997: 2i4n;
Emmett, 1999: 283n). However, the political mobilization which had
begun in earnest in Namibia in the yéars after World War II was brutally
terminated by the shootings of December 1959. The shootings, by the
South African authorities, were a response to African protests against the
apartheid Group Areas Act (Dierks, 1999: 124). In the aftermath of the
killings, there was a substantial South African government clampdown on
nationalist political organizations in Namibia. This resulted in a massive
flight into exile by many of Namibias most highly skilied and articulate
Herero.29 It was in the context of these events that some Herero leaders
who had remained in the territory sought to play down the conflict and
tension engendered by the commemoration of the Herero genocide. In-
stead, they sought to pursue a policy of appeasement, and urged leaders
of the German Community to do the same. As Herero chief Hosea Kutako
stated in response to German commemorations of the battle of Hamakari:
We do not want to cling to the past or to have old war grudges. Our aim is
to forget the past and to look forward rather than backward and to have good
relations with all sections of the population; but good relations cannot exist if
some people try to remind us of tbe bad past. (Windhoek Advertiser, 19643)
In contrast, younger Herero — men such as Clemens Kapuuo, Hosea
Kutako 's eventual successor — were far less conciliatory. When German
settlers wished to commemorate the Herero— German war, Kapuuo re-
minded them of the terror wrought in the genocide, and its links to the
Holocaust:
To our minds there is little diüerence between the extermination order of General
von Trotha and the extermination of Jews by Adolf Hitler. The members of the
Alte Kameraden are today a free people whereas the Hereros are not and are
under a foreign Government which was elected partly by members of the Alte
Kameraden. It is natural that the Hereros would be opposed to the celebration
of a battle which placed them under foreign domination up to this day. ( Windhoek
Advertiser,
As might have been expected, Carl Schrader, spokesman for the Alte
Kameraden, denied that the Herero had been 'exterminated.'
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The Herero genocide and nationalist struggle
Given the gravity of the Herero genocide, it seems remarkable that until
the 19705 the only published account of the genocide in English was the
'Blue Book.' The revisionist academie theses of the German historians
Horst Drechsler and Helmut Bley first appeared in German in 1966 and
1968, in East and West Germany respectively. Bley's work, South West
Africa under German Ruk, 1894—1914, appeared in English in 1971, whilst
Drechsler's 'Let us Die Fighting': The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against
German Imperialism (1884—1915) was only published in English in 1980.
These two excellent studies were primarily concerned with a debate over
the nature of German imperialism and the development of totalitarian
societies. In particular, both books sought - and located - the roots of
National Socialism in Germany's colonial past in Namibia. For both his-
torians, the genocide committed against the inhabitants of Namibia be-
tween 1904 and 1908 foreshadowed later events in Western Europe between
1939 and 1945. As Bley noted in the conclusion to his work: 'In SWA
conditions crossed over into totalitarianism. This confirms, perhaps even
reinforces, Hannah Arendts contention that in African colonialism one
may find the seeds of modern totalitarian rule' (Bley, 1971: 282, referring
to Arendt, 1967: 185—222). These two books had a tremendous impact
upon the manner in which the outside world perceived Namibia and
South Africa's occupation of the territory.
In exile, the genocide against the Herero and Nama came to be one of
the pillars of anti-colonial propaganda, deployed by those who wished to
rid Namibia of its South African occupiers. Initially, this propaganda was
based primarily on the works of Bley and Drechsler. The publication of
To be Born a Nation by the SWAPO publicity bureau in London (SWAPO,
1981) owed much to these two works.
In the early 19805, shortly after completing his Ph.D. in history at
Oxford University, Peter Katjavivi (now vice-chancellor of the University
of Namibia) became the highly articulate spokesman for SWAPO in
London. Well-versed in Namibian history, Katjavivi, in condemning the
attacks of South African forces, did not hesitate to liken them to those
perpetrated by vonTrotha seventy-five years earlier.The anti-colonial strug-
gles of the Herero and Nama came to be applied to all of Namibia, as if
the nationalist struggle had begun with the wars undertaken by Imperial
Germany against the two groups. The published version of Katjavivi's
thesis, A History of Resistance in Namibia, clearly adopted this framework.
In addition, it argued that Namibia's colonial governments were part of a
continuüm, with South African soldiers and police in the 19805 merely
continuing the work begun by the German colonial Schutztruppe in the
18905 (Katjavivi, 1984).30
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Namibian independence, Herero genocide and
Herero unity
Whereas in the years leading up to Namibian independence (1990) the
Herero genocide had been successfully appropriated by nationalist forces
allied to SWAPO, immediately after Namibian independence the geno-
cide became the preserve of Herero elites opposed to the new govern-
ment. In the run-up to independence, Herero activists began seeking a
formal apology from the German government for the events of 1904—08.
In the late 19805, SWANU activists living in Germany approached the
anti-apartheid movement in the Netherlands for assistance in bringing a
case against the West German government.31
Since independence, the SWAPO government of Namibia has gone
out of its way to ensure that Herero claims for reparation remain muted,
or are nestled within the demands of the nation-state that SWAPO
controls. The last time government ministers referred directly to the issue
was during the visit of the then chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl, to
Namibia in 1995. At the time, the Namibian foreign affairs minister,
Theo-Ben Gurirab, noted in an interview that the injustices committed
against the Namibian people by the former German colonial power would
always remain a 'pestering [sic] sore.' The two countries needed to discuss
war reparations 'at some stage,' but the issue was not a current priority for
government, though Gurirab did add: 'We must have the courage and
frankness to discuss this when the time is right' (Fild, 1995). The current
Namibian government is well aware of the benefits that accrue to the state
from continued close cooperation with Germany. No less than 46 per
cent of the country's development budget is paid for by Germany (The
Namibian, 1996). German military advisors and technicians are stationed
in Namibia, where they teach and assist Namibian Defence Force personnel
(Weidlich, 1995). In addition, direct flights from Germany bring euro-
packing tourists, many of whom do not want to be troubled by thoughts
of a terrible past. When the legal successors to the mighty German Kaiser
visited Namibia and enjoyed the hospitality of its government, Chancellor
Helmut Kohl and Bundes-President Herzog refused to meet Herero repre-
sentatives, and were unwilling to offer an apology to the people of Namibia
for what had happened in the past. Instead, Herzog referred to the war as
'a dark chapter in our bilateral relations' and made the extravagant claim
that the massacres constituted 'a bürden on the conscience of every
German' (McNeil, 1998). At the time of writing, the government of
Germany has made no official statement with regard to Herero claims.
Nonetheless, while still in Opposition, Germany's current governing parties
did agree that what had occurred in Namibia constituted genocide (The
Namibian, 1990).
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Regaining the international stage
It is in the context of the above events that on 22 August 1999, Dr
Kuaima Riaruako, the self-appointed paramount chief and king of all of
the Herero, proclaimed that the 'Herero nation' as a whole had decided
to approach the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague in
order to lay a charge of genocide against the German state, calling for
reparations for the slaughter and other atrocities inflicted on the Herero.
At the time, Riaruako s statement ruffled a few feathers in Namibia itself.
German diplomats in Windhoek emailed colleagues in Bonn/Berlin to
look into the issue. Two days later, a clinically worded statement by a
spokesperson of the World Court put everyone, with the exception of
Riaruako, at ease: 'Only states may be parties in contentious cases before
the ICJ and hence submit cases to it against other states.'32
In the absence of a formal apology, the call for war reparations from
the Federal Republic of Germany has become more vociferous. Govern-
ment inaction, the continued extensive presence of German tourists,
settlers, businesses and farms, and continued marginalization of the Herero
lend increasing legitimacy to the Herero claims. This new visibility was
evident with the launch of two court cases in the US District of Colum-
bia. With the support of Afro-American organizations, the 'Herero People's
Reparations Corporation' (HPRC) was established as a corporation, in
keeping with the laws of the District of Columbia, and the court cases
were launched in its name. Three German companies, Deutsche Bank
AG, Terex Corporation (Orenstein und Koppel), and Woermann Line
(Deutsch Afrika Linien), •were charged, along with the Federal Republic
of Germany (in the person of its foreign minister, Joschka Fischer). The
introductory paragraph of the charge reads as follows:
the Federal Republic of Germany ('Defendant' or 'Germany'), in a brutal al-
liance with German multi-national corporations, relentlessly pursued the en-
slavement and the genocidal destruction of the Herero Tribe in Southwest Africa,
now Namibia. Foreshadowing with chilling precision the irredeemable horror
of the European Holocaust only decades later, the Defendant formed a German
commercial enterprise which cold-bloodedly employed explicitly sanctioned
extermination, the destruction of tribal culture and social organization, con-
centration camps, forced labor, medical expenmentation and the exploitation
of women and children in order to advance their common financial interests.33
Conclusion
At various stages in the past hundred years, the Herero genocide has leapt
onto or fallen off the international stage. Every so often, a group of
researchers, activists, or spokespeople stumbles upon this allegedly 'forgot-
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ten' genocide. Attempts are made to draw attention, once again, to the
horrors of the past, whilst governments in power consistently attempt to
sidehne the issue or exploit it for their own ends. The 'Blue Book' thus
was not used to ensure that Herero regained their lands or received com-
pensation for the wrongs done to them. Instead, documentation of the
genocide was used to prevent Germany from regaining control of its
colonies, and ensure that these would instead be granted as mandated
territories to the victorious allies. At later stages, in the interests of white-
settler unity, the 'Blue Book' was dismissed as a propaganda tract. The
denial of the wrongs inflicted upon the Herero has continued to the
present. In Namibia, a postcolonial government, anxious to retain the
support of its German fmancial and trading partner, has sought to mute
demands for war reparations, claiming that all Namibians, irrespective of
ethnicity, sufFered under colonial rule. However, German administration -
and hence genocide - never extended into northern Namibia, the area
from which the current government derives its ethnic base of support.
The Federal Republic of Germany, as the legal successor to Imperial
Germany, is responsible for what happened in the name of the Kaiser in
Namibia. Genocide was perpetrated; thousands of people were put to
work as forced laborers; thousands were subjected to all manner of abuse.
People were robbed of their land, possessions, and livestock, and driven
forever from their ancestral lands. It is hard to say what form recompense
in this egregious case should take; but a simple apology would be a
beginning.
Notes
This chapter builds upon a series of papers that the author presented in the course of
2001 and 2002, of which the most notable arer'Anticipatmg the Kaiser German soldiers
and the Herero Genocide,' presented at 'Die koloniale Begegnung: Afrikanennnen in
Deutschland (1880-1945): Deutsche in Afrika (1880-1918),' Bad Godesberg, 5-8 Sep-
tember 2001; and 'Presenting the Past to Fight the Present: An Overview of the Man-
ner in which the Herero Genocide Has Been Used for Political Purposes in the Course
of the 2oth Century,' Afrika Studie Centrum, Leiden, 2001.
1. Throughout this chapter, I use the term 'Namibia' to refer to the territory that
used to be known as German South West Africa.
2. Regarding the concept of self-fulfüling settler prophecies, see Marks, 1970.
3. Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN),Vi2 Karibib,
author's translation.
4. See Bley, 1971: 158-63, for a discussion of the appointment of von Trotha.
5. See Pool, 1979: 219—40. Omaheke is the Otjiherero name for the sandveld area
east of the Waterberg.
6. Namibian National Archives Wmdhoek (NNAW), ZBU D.i.a Band 3-4, leaf
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165. With thanks to Mr. W. Hillebrecht for fmdmg it at such short notice. Author's
translation.
7. See Lau, 1989; Poewe, 1986; Spraul, 1988; and Sudholt, 1975.
8. ELCRN,V 12, Missions Chronieken, Karibib 1906, written by Missjonary Elger.
See also Berichte der Rheinischen Misstons-Gesellschaft, 1906: 11-12. That this mistreatment
of Herero was not merely mcidental but structural, is indicated by a circular letter from
military headquarters in Windhoek to the German officer commanding Karibib in late
1906. The letter noted: 'due to the mishandlmg of Herero pnsoners, who act as car-
riers, it is advisable to recruit Ovambo labor as carriers.' NNAW, STR 19 l. und 4.
Kompagnie Karibib, Letter Windhuk 16/11/06.
9. ELCRN, V 37, Missions Chronieken, Wmdhoek (Herero/Ovambo).
10. For an overview of German legislation regardmg Africans in Namibia, see
Zimmerer, 2001.
11. Pubhc Records Office (PRO) CO 537/1-17,Telegram from Mr Long, to Aus-
tralia, New Zealand and South Africa, 4 January 1918, quoted in 'Memo for War
Cabmet,' 15 October 1918.
12. Prior to the colonization of Namibia, Khoe speakers dominated southern and
central Namibia. These people, the majority of whom were pastoralists, were deroga-
torily referred to m the past as Hottentots, and are presently known as Nama. In the
wars of 1904—08, the Nama lost virtually all of their land and at least 30 per cent of
their population. For a detailed, and as yet unsurpassed, overview of the German Nama
wars, see Drechsler, 1980: 176-217.
13. The glass plate negatives and files — in fact most of the original source material
used to compile the 'Blue Book' — have been sought out by J. Silvester and J.-B.
Gewald in the National Archives of Namibia. Silvester and Gewald are currently pre-
paring an edited and annotated edition of the 'Blue Book.'
14. Mayer (1967) provides a detailed and authontative account of the Versailles Treaty
negotiations. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1924) contams a complete
text of the 1919 Treaty.
15. Note the remarkable sirmlarity in language used by Brigitte Lau (1989: 5), who
stated, nearly seventy years later, that the 'Blue Book' was 'an English piece of war
propaganda with no credibdity whatsoever.'
16. NNAW, ADM 225, Memorandum on the Blue Book, Annexure A. In addition,
the administration was 'requested to make representations to the Union Government
and to the Bntish Government to have this Bluebook expunged from the official
records of those Governments.' Furthermore, Strauchs motion requested that the Ad-
ministration 'take into consideration the advisability of making representations to the
Union Government and the British Government to impound and destroy all copies of
the Bluebook, which may be found m the public libraries in the respective Countnes
and with the official booksellers mentioned on the title-sheet of the Bluebook.'
17. PRO Fo37i/2ó574 Minute, 20 June 1941.
18. Regarding the term Vernichten, Lau took her lead from Karla Poewe, who stated:
'The use of the word "vernichten," which unknowledgeable people translate as extermin-
ation, in fact meant, in the usage of the times, breaking of military, national, or economie
resistance' (Poewe, 1985: 60). For a response to this debate over meaning, see Jonassohn
and Doerr, 1999.
19. Research into the origins and compilation of the Report on the Natives of South-
West Africa and their Treatment by Germany (London 1918), which is being edited and
annotated for pubhcation in 2002 by J.-B. Gewald and J. Silvester, indicates the report
was based on sound evidence.
20. A shghtly reworked copy of this chapter was published in Heywood, 1995: 39—
52. Lau's article elicited responses from Randolph Vigne and Henning Melber (1990);
Tilman Dedering (1993); and J.-B. Gewald (1994: 67-76). Lau's piece followed on a
series of articles and books that have sought to deny the genocide, or, at the very least,
called for a revision of histories dealing with the war. See, in this regard, Kühne, 1979;
Nuhn, 1989; Poewe, 1986; Spraul, 1988; and Sudholt, 1975.
21. See www.traditionsverband.de/; author's translation.
22. Nordbruch is a German citizen who, upon completing his German national
service, moved to South Africa in 1986. He continues to hve in South Africa, yet travels
widely lecturing to right-wmg audiences. He is closely linked to the German National
Partei Deutschland (NPD), being one of their foremost speech writers.
23. Thus, while searchmg for waterholes in the newly established Herero reserves in
the eastern reaches of South West Africa, British administrators stumbled across the site
of the German massacre of Herero at Ombakaha. See Gewald, 1999: 182.
24. Scott is one of the more remarkable figures of southern African history. Having
encountered Gandhi m India, hè became actively involved in the anticolonial struggle,
first in India and later in southern Africa. Initially Scott campaigned amongst the Indian
commumty m Natal, and later became active m drawing attention to and improving
the shameful living conditions in Bethel, one of Johannesburg's 'native locations.' Fol-
lowing his lobbying for Narmbian independence, Scott was declared a prohibited im-
migrant and prevented from ever returning to Namibia and South Africa. In exile, hè
founded the Africa Bureau in London, and contmued campaigning for Namibia's
independence, even going so far as to drop his initial nonviolent approach. In 1958,
while attending the All African People's Conference in Accra, Scott delivered a speech
to the delegates on behalf of the Herero people living in Namibia, who had been
prevented from sending their own representatives. In his speech, Scott called for the
creation of an African Freedom Army, saying: 'Africa needs such a freedom army ur-
gently if it is to be saved from inhumamty.' Scott continues to be fondly remembered
by many in Namibia. His activities brought the injustices of colomal rule in Namibia
to the attention of the wider world. For an overview of this remarkable man's hfe, see
Troup, 1950.
25. NNAW, SWAA 1981, A 427/48, Rev. M. Scott, typed copy of article that ap-
peared m the New Statesman and Nation, 5 March 1949.
26. Hannah Arendt was the first academie to alert the world to the linkages that
exist between Germany's colonial past and the later development of the National Socialist
state (see Arendt, 1967). The work of East and West German histonans Horst Drechsler
and Helmut Bley further developed this theme, and recently a new generation of his-
torians has once again taken it up. A sampling of some of the papers presented at the
annual meeting of the African Studies Association in Houston, Texas, in November
2001 shows the current prominence of the trend. They included Jan-Bart Gewald,
'Anticipatmg the Kaiser: German Soldiers and the Herero Genocide'; Jeff Gaydish,
'"Die Lösung der Eingeborenenfrage": The Role of the Swakopmund Concentration
Camp m the Development of German "Native Policy" in Southwest Africa'; and Casper
Erischsen, 'Shark Island: Forgotten Concentration Camps and History in Colonial
Namibia, 1904-1908.'
27. See note 26.
28. See, for example, NNAW, SWAA 1981, A 427/48, M. Scott, draft letters of
Bowker written to the Wmdhoek Advertiser and published i March 1950.
29. These included Moses Katjiongua, Mburumba Kerina, Fanuel Kozonguizi,
Zedekia Ngavirue and many more.
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30. Katjavivi's 1984 thesis formed the basis for Katjavivi, 1988. Similar to Katjavivi's
work was that of fellow Herero exile, Kaire Mbuende (1986).
31. Author's personal observation regarding meetings held m Amsterdam in 1988
and 1989.
32. Published accounts in The Namibian newspaper, 25 August 1999 and 8 September
1999.
33. Case papers in the possession of the author.
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